详细信息

审计全覆盖下国有企业出资人、内部审计与腐败治理 --基于博弈模型的分析    

State-owned Enterprise Investors,Internal Audit and Corruption Governance under Full Audit Coverage:Based on Game Model

文献类型:期刊文献

中文题名:审计全覆盖下国有企业出资人、内部审计与腐败治理 --基于博弈模型的分析

英文题名:State-owned Enterprise Investors,Internal Audit and Corruption Governance under Full Audit Coverage:Based on Game Model

作者:冯婧[1];谭超[1]

机构:[1]中国劳动关系学院经济管理学院,北京100048

年份:2021

卷号:36

期号:6

起止页码:48

中文期刊名:审计与经济研究

外文期刊名:Journal of Audit & Economics

收录:NSSD、BDHX、CSSCI、BDHX2020、CSSCI2021_2022

基金:国家社会科学基金一般项目(18BJY049);中央高校基本业务费专项基金(21ZYJS009);北京社会科学基金青年项目(18BJ029)。

语种:中文

中文关键词:腐败治理;审计全覆盖;内部审计;国家审计;出资人审计;经济责任人;审计监督机制

外文关键词:corruption governance;audit full coverage;internal audit;national audit;investor audit;economic responsible persons;audit supervision mechanism

中文摘要:反腐败工作一直是党和国家审计战略部署的重中之重,对我国的发展和稳定具有重要意义。在塞贝利斯(Tsebelis)模型的基础上分别建立只有内部审计的一级监督机制和出资人-内部审计的二级监督机制博弈模型,探讨什么样的机制设计和奖惩制度能更好地抑制腐败行为的发生,进而完善对国企经济责任人不敢腐、不能腐的监督治理体系。研究发现,一级监督机制下,内部审计部门工作人员容易偷懒从而纵容腐败的发生,所以在审计全覆盖要求下,有必要建立健全国企出资人对内部审计部门进行再审计的二级监督机制,并通过加大对内部审计人员的惩罚力度、适当调节出资人审计部门工作人员的奖励力度、减小对经济责任人腐败的惩罚力度,进而降低经济责任人腐败的概率。

外文摘要:Anti-corruption work has always been the top priority of the Party and national audit strategic deployment,which is of great significance to China’s development and stability.Based on the Model of Tsebelis,the primary supervision mechanism of internal audit only and second level supervision mechanism on the basis of investor and internal audit are established,which is to explore what kind of mechanism,reward and punishment system can restrain the corruption,and then improve the economic responsibility of state-owned enterprises from daring not to corrupt to being unable to corrupt of supervision and management system.It was found that:under the primary supervision mechanism,the staff of internal audit departments is easy to be lazy and connived to corrupt.Therefore,under the requirement of full audit coverage,it is necessary to establish and improve the second-level supervision mechanism for state-owned enterprise investors to re-audit the internal audit departments.The probability of corruption of economic responsible persons can be reduced by increasing the punishment of internal auditors,appropriately adjusting the reward of the staff of the audit department of investors,and reducing the punishment of economic responsible persons.

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